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INTRODUCTION
According to Section 52 (1) of the Constitution:
Parliament may amend, add to or repeal any of the provisions of (the] Constitution.
The proviso to subsection (1) states that generally;
. . .  no law shall be deemed to amend, add to or repeal any provision of [the] 
Constitution unless it does so in express terms.
The only permissible exception to this requirement is where an Act of Parliament has 
authorised the publication of a revision of the Constitution.1 Here:
renumbering the provisions of [the] Constitution so as to reflect amendments that 
have been m ade2 is perm itted. Similarly am endm ents that are necessary as a 
consequence of any renumbering may also be effected in non express terms.3
Constitutional Bills4 must be published in the Government Gazette not less than thirty 
days prior to being introduced into Parliament.5 This is a mandatory requirement and 
unless and until it has been complied with, a Constitutional Bill cannot be lawfully 
introduced into Parliament. The purpose of this requirement is to give members of the 
public an opportunity to study the provisions of the Bill so that they can make 
representations to members of Parliament, should they choose to do so.
The original Lancaster House Independence Constitution divided constitutional
amendment procedure into two distinct categories .6 In terms of the first of these,
Constitutional Bills effecting alterations to certain specified provisions required the
affirmative votes of all one hundred members of the then House of Assembly. The specified
provisions were themselves divided into two groups. One group, set out in section 52 (4),
was essentially comprised of certain sections in the Declaration of Rights. Amending, adding
to or repealing these sections, otherwise than by a unanimous vote of the entire membership
of the House of Assembly, was prohibited for 9  period of not less than 10 years after the
coming into force of the Constitution. The second group, set out in section 52 (5),
encompassed provisions relating to the structure of the House of Assembly and the Senate,
as well as the qualifications for enrolment on the white voters roll. These provisions could
not be altered otherwise than by a unanimous vote of all of the members of the House of
Assembly for a period of not less than seven years after the coming into force of the
Constitution. *
*
The second category of amendment procedure embraced all constitutional provisions not 
referred to in section 52 (4) or (5). These could be altered if not less than seventy members
1 Section 52 (1) and (6) as read with section 53 (2) of the Constitution.
2 Section 52 (6) (a) of the Constitution.
3 Section 52 (6) (b) of the Constitution.
4 i.e. a Bill whose purpose is to alter the Constitution in some way.
5 Section 52 (2) of the Constitution.
6 Section 52 (3) (b) of the original Lancaster House Independence Constitution.
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of the House of Assembly voted in favour of such an alteration. Constitutional Bills passed 
by the House of Assembly in terms of either procedure thereafter had to receive the 
affirmative votes of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the Senate (i.e. at 
least 27 votes) . 7 However, if the Senate declined to pass such a Bill within a period of one 
hundred and eighty days after its introduction into the Senate, the House of Assembly had 
the right to forward it directly to the President for his assent, provided only that at least 
seventy members voted in favour of a resolution to that effect.8
THE NEW APPROACH
Following the expiry of the 10 year period provided for in section 52 (4) of the original 
Lancaster House Constitution, section 52 was itself radically altered. The position now is 
that, in order to pass, Constitutional Bills must receive the support of at least two thirds of 
the total membership of Parliament (i.e. at least one hundred votes) . 9 There are no longer 
any special procedures to be followed in respect of altering certain provisions. All alterations 
are now effected through the same procedure. The Speaker must certify that the Bill was 
passed by the required majority, and the Bill cannot be sent to the President for his assent 
unless accompanied by a Speaker’s certificate to that effect.10 Constitutional Bills are not 
subject to examination by the Parliamentary Legal Committee . 11 To date, fifteen 
Constitutional Amendment Acts have been passed.
Are the courts entitled to question whether Parliament has followed the correct procedures 
laid down in the Constitution for amending the Constitution? In Nkomo and Another v 
Attorney-General and Others'2 Muchechetere JA, in a dissenting judgement13 14held that the 
Supreme Court:
. . .  is not competent to enquire into the internal proceedings [of Parliament] relating 
to the . . .  [constitutional] amendment.1,1
He added that:
. . .  once the Speaker has certified . . .  in terms of section 52 (5) of the Constitution that 
the Bill has received the requisite majority on the final vote thereon in Parliament this 
court is precluded from inquiring into and pronouncing upon the validity of 
parliamentary proceedings.15
With respect, the learned judge of appeal was mistaken. Had he been an English judge 
sitting in an English court, considering the relationship between Parliament and the judiciary 
in the context of English constitutional law, his conclusion would probably have been correct. 
However, Zimbabwe is a constitutional democracy, not a parliamentary democracy like 
the United Kingdom. In Zimbabwe, the Constitution is sovereign, not Parliament.16
7 Section 52 (3) (a) of the original Lancaster House Independence Constitution.
8 Section 52 (6) of the original Lancaster House Independence Constitution.
9 Section 52 (2a) of the Constitution.
10 Section 52 (5) of the Constitution.' ,
11 Section 40 B (i) (a) of the Constitution. Because a Constitutional Bill seeks to alter the Constitution, it 
will, by its very nature, be contrary to the provisions of the existing Constitution. There is therefore 
no point in its being examined by the Parliamentary Legal Committee.
12 1993 (2) ZLR 422 (S).
13 The majority decided the case on other grounds and therefore did not address the issue of whether 
the Supreme Court had the power to question the validity of Parliament's legislative procedures.
14 I b id ., at 440.
15 Ib id ., at 442.
16 See C h a irm a n  o f  the P u b lic  S e r v ic e  C o m m is s io n  a n d  O th e rs  v  Z im b a b w e  T ea ch ers  A sso cia tio n  a n d  O th e rs ,  
1996 (9) BCLR 1189 (ZS) at 1198.
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In Smith v Mutasa NO and Another17 Dumbutshena CJ said:
The Constitution of Zimbabwe is the supreme law of the land. It is true that Parliament 
is supreme in the legislative field assigned to it by the Constitution, but even then 
Parliament cannot step outside the bounds of the authority prescribed to it by the 
Constitution.18
The learned Chief Justice added that:
the difference between the powers of the House of Commons and our House of 
Assembly19 is that the Constitution of the United Kingdom does not permit the 
judicature to strike out laws enacted by Parliament. Parliament in the field of legislation 
is sovereign and supreme. That is not the position in Zimbabwe, where the supremacy 
of the Constitution is protected by the authority of an independent judiciary, which 
acts as the interpreter of the Constitution and all legislation. In Zimbabwe the judiciary 
is the guardian of the Constitution and the rights of the citizens.20
In the Smith case Dumbutshena CJ also made it clear that the jurisdiction of the courts was 
not ousted simply by the production of a Speaker's certificate. If this were the case, said the 
learned Chief Justice,
. . .  Parliament could disregard with impunity the provisions of its own statutes and 
the Constitution. It could proceed with its illegal activities w ithout regard to 
fundamental rights, much to the detriment of the citizens.21
For this reason the courts have the power to examine such certificates to determine whether 
they have been lawfully issued.22 It is submitted that relevant objective facts must exist 
justifying the issue and contents of a Speaker’s certificate, and that the judiciary is not 
precluded from enquiring into the existence of such facts.
Provided that Parliament follows the procedures prescribed by section 52, does it have the 
right to alter the Constitution in any way it likes? This issue was considered by Chief 
Justice Gubbay in a speech delivered at the opening of the 1991 legal year in Harare on 14 
January 1991. He said that
a Constitution stands on certain fundamental principles which are its structural pillars.
If these pillars are demolished or even damaged the constitutional edifice will fall.23
He added that:
there is an implied limitation on the power given under section 52 (1) which precludes 
Parliament from abrogating or changing the identity of the Constitution or any of its
17 1989 (3) ZLR 183 (SC).
18 Ib id ., at 192.
19 This case was decided before the abolition of Zimbabwe's bicameral legislative system.
20 At page 192. At 193 he approved of the approach adopted by the Supreme Court of India in Special 
Reference No. 1 of 1964 [1965] 1 SCR 413, where Gajendragadkar CJ said at 446: "When a statute is 
challenged on the ground that it has been passed by a legislature without authority, or has otherwise 
unconstitutionally trespassed on fundamental rights, it is for the courts to determine the dispute and 
decide whether the law passed by the legislature is valid or not."
21 Per Dumbutshena CJ, at 211.
22 Ib id ., at 214.
23 The relevant extracts from the speech are published in Greg Linington, "Is Parliament's Right to 
Amend the Constitution Limited"? L eg a l F o r u m , 1996, Vol. 8, No. 3, page 23. The full text, entitled 
'Speech Delivered at the Opening of the 1991 Legal Year Harare, on 14 January 1991/ was published 
in the L eg a l F o r u m , 1991, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 5.
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basic features. Consequently, any law which has that effect would be pronounced 
invalid by the judiciary.24
Here the Chief Justice was making reference to what is known as the "essential" or "basic" 
features doctrine,25 according to which it is not permissible to change a constitution in a 
way that effectively destroys its intrinsic nature. In other words, changes will only be valid 
where they are consistent with the essential or basic purposes of the Constitution.26 If the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe does indeed contain certain essential features which cannot be 
changed or removed, how are these to be recognised and distinguished from non-essential 
features that may be changed or abolished, provided only that the correct procedures are 
followed in doing so? Attempting to answer this question in the course of his speech, the 
Chief Justice drew attention to the need to consider:
the place of the particular feature in the scheme of the Constitution, its object and 
purpose, and the consequence of its denial on the integrity of the Constitution as a 
fundamental instrument of the country's governance.27
If the Constitution were to be purportedly changed so as to establish a life presidency and 
a non-elected Parliament made up entirely of appointed members, would this be contrary 
to the essential features doctrine and therefore invalid? The answer would appear to be 
yes. To begin with, it is important, when interpreting section 52 (1), to have regard to section 
50 of the Constitution. The latter is the introductory provision of chapter five part 5 of the 
Constitution which deals with the powers and procedures of Parliament. Section 50 is 
itself concerned with establishing the parameters of Parliament's legislative powers. As 
such it is the "key or umbrella provision"28 in chapter five part 5 from which all of 
Parliament's law making powers are derived.
Section 50 states that:
subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the peace, 
order and good government of Zimbabwe.
The clear purpose of the section is to restrict the law making powers of Parliament. Thus 
Parliament is not permitted to legislate in a way that is contrary to "peace, order and good
I
24 Ibid., at page 24. The learned Chief Justice's remarks were motivated by a constitutional amendment 
which authorised the enactment of laws excluding the judiciary from ruling on the fairness of any 
compensation paid for land acquired by the state.
25 On the essential features doctrine see D. Morgan, The Indian Essential Features Cases, ICLQ 1981, 
Vol. 30, p. 307; J. Hatchard, 'Individual Freedoms and State Security in the African Context: The Case of 
Zimbabwe,' Harare, Baobab, 1993, at pages 162-163; A. Butler, The 1996 [South African] Constitutional 
Bill, Its Amending Power, and the Constitutional Principles,' Occasional Paper, Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, 1996; P. Nherere, "How Can A Bill of Rights Best Be Protected Against Undesirable Erosion 
And Amendment"? Legal Forum, 1995, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 40.
26 A. Butler (op. cit.) says at page 12: "An essential features doctrine provides that certain constitutional 
principles are so fundamental that they may not be legitimately be departed from, absent a 
constitutional revolution".
27 GubbayQ, "Speech Delivered at the Opening of the 1991 Legal Year, Harare, on 14 January 1991", op. 
cit., at page 8.
28 To borrow an expression used by Gubbay CJ in In Re Munhumeso and Others, 1995 (1) SA 551 (ZSC) at 
556, in describing the status (at that time) of section 11 of the Declaration of Rights (the Declaration's 
introductory provision). The learned Chief Justice was himself borrowing language used by Amissah 
JP in the Botswana case of Dow v Attorney-General 1994 (6) BCLR 1.
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government." In S v Gatzi, S v Rufaro Hotel (Pvt) Ltd19 Smith J said, in a dissenting High 
Court judgement29 30 that section 50:
confers on Parliament power to make such laws a s it c o n s id e r s  to b e  n e c e s s a r y  for the 
peace, order and good government of Zimbabwe31 (my emphasis).
With respect, the learned judge's understanding of the section is mistaken. The aim of 
section 50 is to impose an objective restraint on Parliament's legislative powers, not to give 
Parliament the discretionary right to decide for itself what constitutes "peace, order and 
good government".32
What exactly do the words "peace, order and good government" mean? Determining the 
limits of such broad and all embracing language is not an easy task. That is not to say, 
however, that the words are without meaning. On occasion, Parliament may purport to 
pass legislation which is so blatantly contrary to "peace, order and good government" that 
no reasonable person could argue that it fell within the parameters of those words. Of 
course, invalidating legislation, including purported constitutional amendments, on the 
ground that section 50 has been contravened, is something that no court ought to do lightly. 
However, in exceptional circumstances, the judiciary will be entitled to do so.
Looking specifically at the words "good government", it is submitted that they mean 
"democratic government." This is due in part, to the emergence, arguably, of a new rule of 
customary international law establishing an entitlement to democracy.33 In addition 
Zimbabwe is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 25 
of which states that every citizen has the right:
(a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; (b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall 
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the 
free expression of the will of the electors.
Paragraph 7 of the Bangalore Principles enables national courts:
. . .  to have regard to international obligations which a country undertakes whether or 
not they have been incorporated into domestic law for the purpose of removing 
ambiguity or uncertainty from national constitutions, legislation or common law.
For this reason it is permissible to interpret the words "good government" as they appear 
in section 50 in a way that accords with article 25 of the Covenant and customary 
international law. This leads inescapably to the conclusion that democracy is an essential 
attribute of "good government." This must mean therefore that Zimbabwe's Parliament 
does not have the right to change the Constitution in a way that would remove its democratic 
features. From this it can be inferred that democracy is one of the essential or basic features 
of the Constitution.
29 1994(1) ZLR 7(H).
30 On this occasion — a criminal review — the High Court sat with 3 presiding judges.
31 I b id ., at 25.
32 The G a tzi case was not concerned with the essential features doctrine. The majority did not address 
the issue of whether section 50 imposes an objective limitation on Parliament's law making powers.
33 See Thomas Frank, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 'A J I L , 1992, Vol. 86:46, page 46 
and James Crawford, 'Democracy and International Law / B Y I L ,  1994, page 113. Customary 
international law is generally part of Zimbabwe's municipal law: -see B a rk er  M c C o r m a c  (P v t)  L td  v 
G o v e r n m e n t  o f  K e n y a , 1983 (4) SA 817 (ZSC).
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Having said that it is now necessary to turn to section 52 (1) and consider the meaning of 
the words "am end," "add to," and "repeal" as they appear in that provision. The 
Constitution does not itself define these words. According to the Interpretation Act "amend" 
"includes vary, alter, modify, add to, delete or adapt",34 while "repeal" "includes rescind, 
revoke and cancel".35 36Unfortunately these definitions do not provide much assistance when 
trying to determine the ambit and scope of the language used in section 52 (1). However, 
some help may be derived from the Indian case of Kesavananda v State of Kerala,M where 
Khanna J observed that:
the word 'amendment' postulates that the old constitution survives without loss of 
its identity despite the change and continues even though it has been subject to 
alterations.37
The word "amend" is therefore not a synonym for "abrogate." Thus a distinction must be 
drawn between amending the Constitution, which is one thing, and abrogating it, which is 
something else altogether. Like "amend", the words "add to" and "repeal" must similarly 
be interpreted restrictively.
The word "any", as it appears in section 52 (1), is also subject to a restrictive interpretation. 
Thus "any" does not necessarily mean "every". For example, although section 52 (1) states 
that "any" provision in the Constitution may be repealed, this is subject to the restriction 
imposed on Parliament's law making powers by section 50. Indeed, section 50 is a provision 
which can never be repealed, because such a "repeal" would facilitate the creation of 
legislation that is not "for the peace, order and good Government of Zimbabwe", the very 
thing prohibited by that section! In other words, repealing section 50, or even changing it 
in a way that diluted its essential content or purpose, would itself be contrary to section 50 
and therefore invalid. This is significant because one example of a provision that cannot be 
repealed or radically altered, suffices to destroy the notion that "any" is synonymous with 
"every". Moreover, restrictions on change exist even with respect to those provisions that 
can be amended. Thus there is a distinction between the power to alter any provision, 
which is one thing, and the power to change any provision in any way, which is another 
thing altogether.
Basically, changes to the Constitution will be permissible to the extent that the changes in 
question accord with the purposes of the Constitution's essential features, such as democracy. 
An amendment may be validly enacted where its objective is to change the form  through 
which these purposes are attained. However, where the purported change seeks to frustrate, 
subvert or nullify the substance of the purpose in question, it will be invalid. Thus the 
essential features of the Constitution are really its substantive purposes, which are meant to 
endure, while the non-essential features are the form  through which these purposes are 
expressed. For example, the provisions establishing a bicameral legislative system were 
repealed and a unicameral legislature was set up instead. However, the essential feature of 
democracy was not adversely affectedly  this constitutional amendment (at least, in any 
unduly serious way). This is because the substance of the essential feature in question, 
democracy, is able to function in both bicameral and unicameral systems. All that has 
changed is the form  through which democracy operates. The important point is that
34 Section 3 (3) of the Interpretation Act.
35 Ibid.
36 AIR 1973 SC 1461.
37 Ibid.
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democracy itself continues and endures. The creation of a life presidency and a Parliament 
made up entirely of appointed members, on the other hand, would go beyond merely 
altering the form of Zimbabwean democracy. Such a change would actually eliminate 
democracy altogether, and would therefore constitute an abrogation of imi 
constitutional provisions, rather than their mere amendment.
A number of possible objections to the essential features doctrine may now be considered. 
In the first place, can it be aigued that the doctrine is not applicable in the Zimbabwean 
context because the Constitution was never intended to be a permanent and enduring 
document? In the opinion of the present author, such a view is unduly simplistic and 
therefore untenable. Of course, some parts of the Constitution granted at independence 
were always intended to be transitional: for example, the twenty seats in the House of 
Assembly reserved for white members elected by voters registered on the special white 
voters roll. These seats could only be removed by a Constitutional Bill that received the 
support of all one hundred members of the House of Assembly for the first seven years o f the 
Constitution's life. The seven year period is significant. It points to the fact that the white 
seats were not intended to remain beyond that period. They were never meant to remain a 
permanent feature of the Constitution. It is therefore important to distinguish between 
provisions which, by their very nature, are obviously supposed to have only a limited 
lifespan, and those that are designed to endure virtually forever.
Another objection is that put forward by Pearson Nherere.38 He has argued that:
the essential features doctrine is no more than the theory of natural law applied to 
constitutions in the latter half of the twentieth century. The ideas of natural justice are 
regulated by no fixed standard. The ablest and purest of men have differed upon the 
subject. Where are they to be found?
He believes that if there is nothing in the Constitution (such as a preamble) which expressly 
states what the essential features are, identifying them:
becomes a matter for the judge in the exercise of his value judgement. What is or is 
not an essential feature . . .  would then depend on the particular judge concerned.
Certainly it must b f admitted that ascertaining what a constitution's essential features are 
will not always be an easy exercise. Nevertheless, it is submitted that in most cases it will 
not be necessary for judges to make value judgements when dealing with this issue. This is 
because the essential features doctrine does not advocate appealing to something outside 
the text of a constitution, such as the concept of natural justice, when trying to determine 
whether a constitution has certain fundamental and unalterable provisions. It is simply a 
question of seeking an answer through the application of modern purposive statutory 
interpretation.
To date the essential features doctrine has not been invoked in any Zimbabwean 
constitutional litigation.39 However, if this qccurs, and if the courts uphold arguments based
38 Pearson Nherere, "How Can a Bill of Rights be Protected Against Undesirable Erosion and 
Amendment"? op. cit.
39 But the doctrine has been successfully invoked in a number of Indian cases. The Kesavananda case has 
already been referred to. In another Indian case, Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain (1975) ASC 1590, the 
Prime Minister of India, Mrs Gandhi, had been found guilty of corrupt electoral practices by the 
High Court of India, which quashed her election to Parliament. She appealed against this decision to 
the Supreme Court. While her appeal was pending, Parliament — dominated by her supporters — 
purported to amend the Constitution (a feat achieved in a mere four days). The 'amendment' provided
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on the doctrine, they may find themselves being accused of preventing Parliament from 
exercising its law making functions. Such accusations would be misplaced. The judiciary 
would simply be making the point that Parliament's legislative powers are limited. It is 
the duty of the judiciary to uphold and respect the Constitution, and this includes ensuring 
that Parliament does not legislate beyond the powers ascribed to it by the Constitution.
<
that her election was valid "notwithstanding any order made by the court". Clearly this was contrary 
to the holding of free and fair elections, an essential feature of the Indian Constitution. For this reason, 
the Indian Supreme Court declared the purported 'amendment' to be invalid. See also State of Rajasthan 
v Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 1361; and Gupta v Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149. In Minerva Mills v 
Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789, a constitutional 'amendment' purported to give Parliament the 
right to amend all constitutional provisions and eliminated judicial review of constitutional 
amendments. The Supreme Court of India invalidated the 'amendment' on the ground that it was 
contrary to the essential features of the Constitution. See also the Bangladesh case of Anwar Hossain 
Chowdury v Bangladesh, 41 DLR (AD) 1989 165.
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